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ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT ON THE STOCK MARKET OF CHEMICAL DISASTERS: 
PETROCHEMICAL COMPANIES IN INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX IN KOREA 
 
The chemical industries in Korea have the industrial structure of a developing country 
focused more on basic chemical compounds and wider use of products rather than fine chemical 
goods. The chemical industry is composed of 10% knowledge (pharmaceuticals), 30% specialty 
(consumer products, agricultural chemicals, coatings, and fine chemicals), and 60% basic 
(polymers, synthetic rubber and fibers, basic inorganic chemicals, and basic organic chemicals). 
This study examined 18 different petrochemical, food chemical and steel companies with 
26 chemical disasters. Capelle-Blancard, Laguna (2010) showed the problems related to 
providing robust empirical evidences on the stock market reaction to chemical disasters. This 
analysis which was based on using abnormal returns (AR ) and cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) concluded that chemical disasters like explosions, plant fires, and chemical leaks caused 
both negative and positive stock market reaction. Most of the companies that I tried to test the 
hypotheses showed negative ARs and CARs after the event as I expected. 
I thought that the effects on stock market reactions were different according to the type, 
extent, and number of casualties in the accident. When I performed the event study with the topic, 
I got the results from 15 cases of the relationships between the ARs or CARs and the extent, type, 




cases revealed that the degree of severity of the chemical accidents was not really related to the 
market reaction. The reason why the unmatched results arose was because of the exposure of the 
event information. Hamilton (1995) mentioned that the market is influenced by the leak of 
information. 
I have concluded that the relationship between the ARs/CARs and the extent, type, and 
the number of casualties are not seriously related to each other. There is a limitation to this 
conclusion because of the leak of information to the market (Hamilton, 1995). Korajczyk, Lucas, 
and McDonald (1990) mentioned the asymmetry should be of greatest concern to potential 
buyers of common stock. That means there should be a factor(s) affect(s) the market and its 
behavior. The country like Korea is likely to conceal or control the information of the chemical 
disasters.  
According to the Center for Occupational Environmental Health (COEH) in Korea, there 
was a briefing session in June 2013 about the current state of concealment of fires, explosions 
and chemical spills in industrial complexes at the congress. The statistical data investigation in 
the accident has a couple of problems. First, there is no report of the accident to local authority if 
the petrochemical plant doesn’t have death casualties. Second, there are differences in the 
accident statistics between the central and the local government. Lastly, the classification of 
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Chemical & Engineering News (C&EN) published in 2008 by American Chemical 
Society (ACS), revealed, through its analysis results on chemical corporations; the remarkable 
development of businesses focused on commodity goods an  synthetic chemicals and the slump 
in businesses focused on specialty goods. Furthermor , it noted that new corporations in Asia are 
leading the development of the chemical industry. 
The chemical industry in Korea has shown the industrial structure of a developing 
country focused more on basic chemical compounds an a wider use of products rather than fine 
chemical goods. The chemical industry is composed of 10% knowledge (pharmaceuticals), 30% 
specialty (consumer products, agricultural chemicals, coatings, and fine chemicals), and 60% 
basic (polymers, synthetic rubber and fibers, basic inorganic chemicals, and basic organic 
chemicals) (C&EN, 2008). 
Outputs of the chemical industry include petroleum products like gasoline and diesel, 
synthetic resins, and rubbers, and textiles. Additionally, the base materials contained in 
electronics such as smartphones, light emitting diode (LED) TVs, and automotives are made 
from chemical materials. The chemical industry is the most important cutting edge field, so 
developed countries push for further research and development of technologies like solar cells, 
bio plastics, and so forth. 
Chemical disasters affect firms’ profit structures by the market reaction, and also 
generate negative externalities on health and ecosystems (Capelle-Blancard & Laguna, 2010). 




largest accidental marine oil spill in the history f the petroleum industry, and estimated to be 
between 8 and 31% larger in volume than previous oil pills (Wikipedia.org). BP’s stock price, 
as of the writing of this paper, is still down about a third from its $60 price before the spill, a loss 
of about $60 billion in market value. 
The Exxon Valdez oil spill occurred in Prince William Sound, Alaska, on March 24, 
1989, when Exxon Valdez, an oil tanker bound for Long Beach, California, struck Prince 
William Sound’s Bligh Reef and spilled 260,000 to 750,000 barrels of crude oil (Wikipedia.org). 
Initially the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989 was financially much worse for Exxon Mobil than for 
BP (huffingtonpost.com). An Alaska jury ordered Exxon to pay $5 billion in punitive damages, 
matching a full year’s profit in 1990. The total cost f cleaning up the Exxon Valdez spill has 
been estimated at $7 billion, a little more than a ye r’s profit for Exxon. 
The chemical industry is the core industry in Korea, valued at around $77.7 billion and 
accounting for 14% of the total exports in 2011. This study focuses on the impact on the stock 
market of occurrences such as explosions, fires, and chemical leaks in the Ulsan and Yeosu 












The first objective of this study is to identify the relationship between Korean chemical 
accidents related to explosions, fires, and chemical leaks, and Korean daily stock market returns 
of target companies. The impact of the daily returns is estimated by the difference between actual 
returns and expected returns. 
The second objective is to determine the relationship between stock market reactions and 
the extent of accidents and the number of casualties. This study deals with 26 different cases 
from 18 chemical and petrochemical firms. It is important to identify any significant patterns of 
market reactions as this information can be used to predict future responses to accidents. 
Generally, the accidents related to petrochemical materials are likely to be occurred in 
summer and winter than the other two. In my study I on’t focus on some specific season in 
which the accident occurred but there should be the one we can specifically call it. However, 
there is a limitation of collecting the data of all the accidents I deal with. It is important to look 









BACKGROUND ON CHEMICAL DISASTERS AND CHEMICAL INDUSTRY IN KOREA 
 
The petrochemical industry manufactures ethylene, propylene, and so on using crude oil 
or natural gas and then synthetic resin, synthetic rubber, and chemical products result from these 
processes. The safety conditions in petrochemical industries are considered to be general safety 
requirements applicable to the initial design, plant safety, and environmental safety. 
Such safety requirements consist of a factory site,fire detectors, the building’s 
architectural design, pipe layout, and electric power layout. Safety requirements for 
manufacturing processes use a distribution control system that controls fuel and heat sources and 
responds to mal-functional operations. There are sev ral control systems to perform 
decompression such as interlocking system and safety valves. To protect the environment, 
petrochemical plants are advised to construct waste wa r disposal facilities. This facility treats 
wastewater that results from plant.1 
Chemical accidents refer to an event resulting in the release of a substance or substances 
that are hazardous to human health and/or the environment in the short or long term (IPCS, 
OECD, UNEP, and WHO, 1994). In December 2001, the World Health Organization (WHO), 
through the International Programme on Chemical Safety (IPCS), convened an expert 
consultation group on the public health response to chemical incidents.  
After consulting with experts, it was recognized that many countries had a limited 
capacity to respond to chemical incidents. In May 2002, the 55th World Health Assembly agreed 
                                                           
1 The chemical plant which manufactures synthetic resin petrochemical products emits waste gas, and the gas goes 




upon a resolution expressing concern about the global public health implications of a possible 
release, or deliberate use of biological, chemical, or radiological nuclear agents. In August 2002, 
IPCS started to compile a database of global chemical in idents, compiled from various sources 
and includes details of the types and the extent of accidents (WHO.int).  
Through the IPCS, WHO works to establish the scientif c basis for the sound 
management of chemicals, and to strengthen national cap bilities and capacities for chemical 
safety. Chemical safety is achieved by undertaking all activities involving chemicals in such a 
way as to ensure the safety of human health and the environment. There are ten primary 
chemicals of major public health concern: air pollution, arsenic, asbestos, benzene, cadmium, 
dioxin and dioxin-like substances, inadequate or excess fluoride, lead, mercury, and highly 
hazardous pesticides (WHO.int).  
That chemical processing plants are not safe is true, as the plants themselves have a high 
probability of exploding and product materials greatly ffect the environment. There are many 
industrial complexes in Korea such as the Ulsan petrochemical industrial complex, Yeosu 
petrochemical industrial complex, Banwol-shiwha industrial complex, Incheon industrial 
complex, and Daesan petrochemical industrial complex. Most industrial complexes have been in 
operation for more than 30 years with the exception of the Daesan industrial complex. This 
means that old facilities have a high possibility for negligent accidents, to occur. Because of this, 
I chose the Ulsan and Yeosu industrial complexes to test the hypothesis that there is a 
relationship between chemical disasters and the market reaction. 
The industrial complex of Korea began with the ‘The First 5 years Economic 




1962. The Korean government gave priority to light industries such as textiles, plywood, 
electrical products, and shoe industries in the 1960s, carried forward the development of large 
scale industrial complexes in local areas with heavy chemical industries in order to prevent the 
industrial centralization of capital in the 1970s. The Korean government focused on 
technologically-intensive industries to increase national competitiveness in semiconductors, 
electronics, and automotive industries in the 1980s, information and communications, 
semiconductor industries, and fine chemistry in the 1990s, and established the political base to 
foster technology fusion and green technology industries in the 2000s. 
Ulsan industrial complex is the first industrial complex developed to foster iron 
manufacturing, oil refinery, and fertilizer in the 1960s, and shipbuilding, and the automotive 
industry in the 1980s. Ulsan has favorable water levels for the development of ports, large tidal 
ranges, industrial water from the Taehwa river, accessibility to Pusan port, and inexpensive land 
due to its advantageous location (National Archives of Korea).  
There are 878 companies with 90,584 people working in the Ulsan industrial complex; 
785 of these companies are operational, and specialize n food, textiles, lumber, petrochemicals, 
steel, machinery, electrical engineering, and transportation equipment industries in 2012.2 
Additionally, there are 273 companies with 17,591 people in the Yeosu industrial complex; 225 
of these companies are operational, and specialize n food, lumber, petrochemicals, steel, 
machinery, and electrical engineering in 2012. The Ulsan, and Yeosu industrial complexes have 
contributed to economic development for the past 50 years, but there have been general accidents 
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such as chemical leaks, explosions, and fires due to the absence of manpower for maintenance of 
the facilities. 
With the groundbreaking ceremony of the Ulsan industrial center in February of 1962, 
the construction of the factory site and supporting facilities began by 1966. The Ulsan oil 
refinery was expanded over the petrochemical industrial complex through regional extension 
announcement in July of 1967. Twenty-one large scale factories were constructed in the 
Jansangpo and Yeocheon areas and social overhead capital facilities by 1971. Therefore major 
industries changed from petrochemical to car manufact ring and ship building, which were 
mechanical device industries. In spite of the deterioration of facilities, the chemical plants in 
Korea are not ready to prevent the accidents. With each industrial complex’s environmental 
contamination, negligent accidents have occurred frquently with property damage and 
casualties and as increase in social issues.  
There is a noticeable point within the Yeosu industrial complex where many of deaths 
and casualties have been caused by hazardous chemical leaks, and explosions of line operations 
which put subcontract workers in danger. The death rate of subcontract workers has increased 
from 77.8% (2001) to 66.7% (2002) and 80.0% (2003) (Chemical Market Research Inc., 2004). 
The number of deaths of subcontract workers over a y ar was the percent ratio. It means that the 
proportion of subcontract workers to main workers was relatively high. For example, there was 
an explosion in Daelim Industry on March 14, 2013. Six deaths and 11 injuries were caused, and 





According to the parliamentary inspection report of he Environment and Labor 
Committee, 97 casualties and 168 injuries resulted from 203 chemical accidents in the Yeosu 





















The literature review is divided into three sections. The first section describes the 
literature that identifies how the economy is influenced by chemical disasters. The second 
section examines the literature that has studied evnt study methodology and has applied it in the 
petrochemical industry sector. The third section describes studies that have examined the 
economic impacts of the chemical disasters or enviro mental accidents in Korea.  
 
Chemical Disasters Influencing the Economy 
There are some factors that influence the national economy such as chemical disasters 
from petrochemical plants or environmental accidents such as oil spills. Souza Porto and Freitas 
(1995) showed the serious health hazards and irreversibl  environmental damage from the 
examples of Seveso (1976) and Bhopal (1984) by using the concept of the socio-political 
amplification of risk. The chemical accident of Seveso in Italy resulted in the exposure to 2, 3, 7, 
and 8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (TCDD)3 in most of the population and the Bhopal accident in 
India consisted of was a gas leak considered the worst industrial disaster.  
Over 500,000 people were exposed to methyl isocyanate gas and the official immediate 
death toll was 2,259. The point of view of this paper is that the social, political and economic 
structures in developing countries make them more vulnerable to accidents (Wikipedia.org). The 
                                                           
3 Within days a total of 3,300 animals were found dead, mostly poultry and rabbits. Emergency slaughtering 
commenced to prevent TCDD from entering the food chain. The most evident adverse health effect ascertain d was 




more developed the country, the lower the deaths per accident in spite of many accidents, and the 
less developed the country, the higher the death rate. 
Vilchez, Sevilla, Montiel, and Casal (1994) estimated he impact of accidents involving 
hazardous materials and divided the chemical disasters into several types. The data showed the 
percentage of accidents involving transport (39%), process plants (24.5%) and storage (17.4%), 
and the frequency of occurrence of accidents in highly populated areas (66%), lowly-populated 
areas (12%) and rural areas (22%). They tried to figure out the cause and effect of accidents 
through population density, the origin of the accident, type of chemicals, and type of accident. 
However, they argued that the economic losses from the accidents are only very limited. The 
reason why it is limited pertains to the difficulty in evaluating these losses, and the low tendency 
of industries to publish this information. 
 
Event Study Methodology in Chemical Disasters 
The stock prices reflect all available information and expectations about the future 
prospects of firms. Researchers can investigate the relevance of a particular event for a firm’s 
future prospects by examining its impact on the firm’s stock price. Event study analysis 
differentiates between the normal returns and the abnormal returns. The normal return in finance 
is known as return on investment (ROI) and the rate of profit. The rate of profit (ROI) is the ratio 
of money gained or lost on an investment. The abnormal eturn is the same as a normal return 
technically, but occurs due to an event. The events are mergers, dividend announcements, 
company earnings announcements, and lawsuits. This study deals with the abnormal return 




Capelle-Blancard and Laguna (2010) examined the stock market reaction to industrial 
disasters across the entire world. They selected 200 events and excluded two thirds of events, 
since the firms did not involve publicly-traded companies. They finally identified 38 publicly 
traded companies with 64 accidents. They found that petrochemical firms in their sample 
experienced a drop in market value of 1.3% over the two days immediately following the disaster. 
The losses are significantly related to the magnitude of accidents, the number of casualties and 
the amount of chemical pollution. They built an original sample of the 64 explosions in chemical 
plants and refineries that occurred from 1990 to 2005 and performed a daily event study as 
implemented by MacKinlay (1997). Abnormal returns were computed given the market model 
parameters estimated with OLS through the estimation period ranges of 180 trading days. They 
also calculated an individual t-statistic for each firm’s abnormal return for each accident day and 
concluded that the stock market reacted negatively after the accidents. 
Fields and Janjigian (1989) investigated US public electric-utility stock price reactions to 
the Chernobyl nuclear-power accident. They analyzed 89 public-electric-utility firms with event 
study methodology and drew results of significant negative abnormal returns during the twenty 
day period after the accident. There were 89 firms in the sample including 57 nuclear firms and 
32 nonnuclear firms and abnormal returns for the entire sample declined almost 3% during the 
three day period following the accident. They concluded that firms using nuclear power 
especially experienced greater losses than did nonnuclear firms. 
Hamilton (1995) examined the pollution data, in the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI), 
released by the United States Environmental Protecti n Agency (EPA). Pollution figures 
reported in the TRI provide “news” to the financial community to the extent that the data 




developed by Dodd and Warner (1983) and concluded that the average of the abnormal returns 
for companies was not statistically significant. Hamilton also pointed out that why the abnormal 
returns occurred the day before the official announcement was not significant as the data not 
being leaked to the market. Lastly, he argued that the event study methodology is especially well 
suited for studying the impact of the TRI. 
Grand and D’Elia (2005) showed that positive environmental news has no impact, while 
negative news does have an effect on average rates of r turn a few days following its appearance. 
They tried to find the same results with different types of positive news such as ISO certification, 
but it had no effect. However, investment decisions do have a positive significant influence on 
returns. They used the estimation window of 165 working days and ran sensitivity analysis for 
120 and 210 working days. This paper concludes that the markets react negatively to court and 
government rulings. 
 
Applied Event Study Methodology Environmental accidents in Korea 
Dasgupta, Hong, Laplante, and Mamingi (2006) examined the reaction of investors to the 
publication of national environmental laws and regulations, and tried to show that the enterprises 
appearing on the lists have experienced a significat decline in their market valuation. They used 
the market model which assumes a linear relationship between the return of any security to the 
return of the market portfolio. The 96 environmental ews events were used to figure out the 
returns, and they concluded that the investors on the Korean Stock Exchange do strongly react to 




Hong and Hwang (2001) investigated the causes and effects of major Korean 
environmental accidents in the 90s, and the relationship between public information on polluting 
behavior and capital market responses. They calculated average abnormal returns on event 
windows from -10 days to +10 days and also tried to evise alternative approaches to investigate 
the relationship between market reactions and enviro mental accidents. They concluded that 
major environmental accidents have had huge impacts on he various shareholders, including the 
environmental consciousness of the general public, government and companies. The damaging 
effects on companies are illustrated in terms of financial compensation, and a loss in market 
share. The contribution of this paper is to provide information for firms and shareholders of 
petrochemical companies. The information herein will he p companies build strategies to prevent 















This section shows how an event study methodology is conducted within this study. 
Discussions of the event, methodology, sample companies, and data occur in this section. 
Measurements of abnormal returns, cumulative abnormal returns, and testing for significance are 
also explained. 
 
Event Study Methodology 
The event study method is a tool that can help examine the economic impact of events 
such as earning announcements, changes in the severity of regulations, and money supply 
announcements (Binder, 1998). He showed the two reasons why the event study methods have 
been used: (1) to test the null hypothesis that the market efficiently incorporates information and 
(2) under the maintained hypothesis of market effici n y. 
Henderson (1990) showed that the steps to follow in the design of the event study: (1) 
define the date of the news which can be the event, (2) characterize the returns of each firm in 
the absence of the news, (3) measure the difference between observed returns and “no-news” 
returns, (4) aggregate the abnormal returns across fi m  and across time, and (5) statistically test 
the aggregated returns to determine whether the abnormal returns are significant. This study uses 







Identifying an event and event window is the initial step in conducting an event study. 
MacKinlay (1997) showed the event is any objective e nt of interest, and the event window 
specifies the period of the stock prices of the firms involved in the event. This study includes 26 
chemical disasters including explosions, chemical le ks and fires, 22 cases in the Ulsan and the 
Yeosu industrial complexes, and four cases from the o r complexes in Korea. The accidents 
occurred between 2001 and 2013. Table 1 summarizes dat and types of accidents in the events.  
This study defines the event window as larger than a period of interest since it allows an 
examination of the period surrounding the event (Armitage, 1995 & MacKinlay, 1997). 
Armitage (1995) showed that two-way event windows are common in finance literature, if the 
event date can be determined with precision. Two-way event windows should be supplemented 
by cumulative abnormal returns for longer periods after the event window. 
As in Capelle-Blancard and Laguna (2010), within this study the abnormal and 
cumulative abnormal returns are examined with the estimation window of 190 trading days 
before the event day in chemical disaster accidents, a d the event window is to be -10 trading 
days and +10 trading days of the event day of day zero. The topic that I am interested in is 
chemical disasters in Korea, so the measuring periods of the estimation and event windows is 
follows Capelle-Blancard and Laguna (2010)’s methods. The types, and extent of chemical 
accidents varies and the time of dealing with the accidents is not expected. I therefore refer the 






Table 1. Summary of the Each Dates and Duration of the Events 
Company Industry Event Date Accident Type Casualties Location 
Hanwha 
Chemical (HW) 
Chemical Sep 24, 2001 Explosion 1 death / 1 injured Yeosu 
 Oct 15, 2001 Explosion 1 death / 2 injured  
      
Lotte Chemical 
(LT) 
Chemical Oct 5, 2001 Fire 3 deaths Yeosu 
 Oct 3, 2003 Explosion 1 death / 6 injured  




Chemical Mar 17, 2002 Fire Unknown* Yeosu 
 Aug 25, 2004 Explosion 1 death / 1 injured  




Chemical Oct 20, 2003 Fire Unknown* Yeosu 
     
     
Cheil Industries 
(CH) 
Chemical Jan 22, 2006 Fire Unknown* Yeosu 
     
     
Daelim Industry 
(DL) 
Chemical Oct 15, 2001 Explosion 1 death / 2 injured Yeosu 
 Mar 14, 2013 Explosion 6 deaths / 11 injured  
      
SK Co., Ltd. 
(SK) 
Chemical Oct 20, 2003 Fire Unknown* Ulsan 
     
     
Hyosung (HS) Chemical Sep 21, 2004 Fire No casualties Ulsan 
 Feb 24, 2008 Fire No casualties  
      
S-Oil (SO) Petrochemical Apr 9, 2004 Fire Unknown* Ulsan 
     
     
SK Energy 
(SKE) 
Petrochemical Oct 26, 2010 Explosion 1 death Ulsan 
 Dec 20, 2010 Explosion 1 death / 6 injured  




Petrochemical Feb 8, 2011 Explosion 2 deaths / 2 injured Ulsan 
     
     
Hyundai EP 
(HD) 
Chemical Plastic  Aug 17, 2011 Explosion 8 injured Ulsan 
     
     
Samyang Genex 
(SY) 
Food Chemical Apr 22, 2004 Explosion 3 deaths Ulsan 
 Feb 27, 2011 Explosion No casualties  
      
KG Chemical 
(KG) 
Chemical Apr 28, 2004 Chemical Leaks Unknown* Gyeonggi 
     
     
Kumyang (KY) Fine Chemical Apr 21, 2005 Explosion Unknown* Pusan 
     
     
DSR Steel Mar 10, 2006 Chemical Leaks Unknown* Suncheon 
     
     
Samsung 
Electronics (SE) 
Electronic Jan 27, 2013 Chemical Leaks 1 death / 4 injured Hwasung 
     
     
Samsung Fine 
Chemical (SFC) 
Fine Chemical Apr 14, 2013 Chemical Leaks Unknown* Ulsan 
     
     




Determining Firms for Event Study 
The companies collected from three different regions in Korea are the Ulsan industrial 
complex, the Yeosu industrial complex, and the industrial complex located Gyoung-gi. Those 
firms experienced the chemical disasters that were initially chosen from the casebook of 
hazardous chemicals of the Ministry of Environment. Then, each firm is categorized according to 
its business type such as chemical, petrochemical, food chemical, fine chemical, and steel.  
 
Hypotheses of the Stock Market Reaction 
The hypotheses related to stock price reaction to the accidents of each company can be 
tested under hypotheses of showing negative abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) after the accidents. To be clear in statistics, there is no relationship between the 
market reaction and the chemical accidents as a null hypothesis. If these kinds of incidents like 
explosions, fires, and chemical leaks are unexpectedly occurring in industrial complexes, any 
investors and member firms are likely to sell their shares due to the companies’ reliability and 
reputation or lack thereof.  
 
Estimating Normal Returns 
Evaluating impacts of the events on stock values requi s a measure of abnormal returns. 
The abnormal return is an actual ex-post return of the security over the event window minus the 




as the expected return which is the return of investm nts in the absence of the events. The 
abnormal return is estimated as follows: 
              |
       (1) 
where , , and |
 are the abnormal return, actual, and normal returns respectively 
for firm i and time period t. Xt is the market return in OLS market model which assumes a stable 
linear relation between the market return and the indiv dual stock return (MacKinlay, 1997). 
Armitage (1995) and MacKinlay (1997) reviewed different models for the normal return 
estimation and concluded that the market model by an OLS is the most suitable model to 
estimate the normal returns. This study uses the OLS market model: 
                          (2) 
            E  0,          (3) 
where  and  are the return of the event time t on stock of firm i and the market portfolio, 
respectively.  and  are the estimated coefficients, and  is the error term and is assumed to 
have a zero mean and constant variance. 
The actual return can be calculated between the day’s stock price and the day before’s 
stock price of an individual firm on the event window; the day’s stock price minus the day 
before’s stock price and divided by the day before’s stock price (actual return = today’s stock 
price – yesterday’s stock price / yesterday’s stock price)4. The normal return is defined as the 
expected return can be calculated from    of the equation (4). a) The alpha and beta 
                                                           
4
 The actual return is the change of stock prices from the market reaction to the incidents such as a firm’s earning 




are from the OLS regression model equation (2) on estimation window. b) The two values (alpha, 
beta) with the market return (peer-group market return: )5 of each event day go to  
 of the equation (4). The abnormal return is the value of the actual return minus the 
expected return. 
 
The problems of Event Study 
Henderson Jr. (1990) showed a few possible and potentially important problems; (1) The 
timing of an event. The issue is not when an event occurred, but when the market was informed. 
The topic dealt with in this study is a chemical accident. (2) A concrete definition of the 
estimation and event windows. The estimates are derived from the estimation window and these 
are used to define expected or normal returns. (3) The calculation of excess returns which is the 
difference between observed returns and the returns predicted. (4) Abnormal returns must be 
aggregated both across firms and across time. What Henderson Jr. (1990) mention is to check the 
average abnormal returns from the companies affected by the news at the same time. (5) 
Statistical tests to see the market reaction to the accidents. Henderson Jr. (1990) shows the way 
to check the reaction with the graphics. However, there are a lot of methods to test statistical 
significant now.6 
The market model that this study applies to is the OLS regression model, and there are a 
number of statistical assumptions. Henderson Jr. (1990) shows that the residuals are normally 
distributed with a mean of zero, and not serially correlated, have a constant variance, and are not 
                                                           
5 The market return (peer-group market return: Rmt) is the daily return of market index which consist of chemical 
companies. This study uses the chemical index in KOSPI to calculate the returns.  
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correlated with the explanatory variables. Binder (1998) explains that the potential problems in 
the hypothesis test are the abnormal return estimators re not independent, and the estimators do 
not have identical variance. These two problems occur: (1) the estimators are cross-sectionally 
correlated, (2) there are have different variances across firms, (3) the estimators are not 
independent across time for a given firm, and (4) have greater variance during the event period. 
When we try to predict with the plausible explanation using OLS regression in the study, 
there are unexpected problems. Greene (2003) showed a possible model we can apply to use 
called Tobit Model. If we face the problems with regr ssion when the dependent variable is 
incompletely observed and regression when the dependent variable is completely observed but is 
observed in a selected sample that is not representative of the population. These models share the 
feature that OLS regression leads to inconsistent parameter estimates because the sample is not 
representative of the population. The reason why the leading causes of incompletely observed 
data is truncation and censoring. Truncation occurs when some observations on both the 
dependent variable and regressors are lost. Censoring ccurs when data on the dependent 
variable is lost but not data on the regressors. 
In my study I use OLS regression using stock prices of petrochemical companies. It does 
not fit the first problem of unobserving of dependet variable that is an individual company’s 
stock return. However, we can dispute a possibility of being a problem of representativeness of 
samples. I use the peer-market stock prices returns as an explanatory variable and there might be 
a suspicion of representativeness of the population. The stock price data all I use from the 





Calculation of Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
As shown in the previous section, the abnormal return (AR) is calculated by subtracting 
the expected return from the actual return. The equation for calculating AR is; 
                                     (4) 
where , , and    are the abnormal return, actual return, and expected return, 
respectively, for firm i and event date t. The test period is 21 days from -10 days to +10 days 
from an event date, designating the event date as day 0. 
Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is an aggregation of multiple-day ARs of the post-
estimation window. MacKinlay (1997) mentioned that CAR is important to monitor periodical 
inferences for the event of interest. The CAR is calcul ted using the following equation: 
                        ,   ∑         (5) 
where ,  and ∑   are the cumulative abnormal return and summation of the 
abnormal return between t1 to t2, respectively. Salin and Hooker (2001) choose fourpost-event 
CAR windows: 5, 10, 20, and 30 day windows to be applied to food recall.  I chose 5, 10, 20, and 
30 day windows in this study. In considering the handling of an accident, the duration of the 
chemical accidents is largest variable in the extent and type of the accident. Moreover, there is no 
information of the period, so I applied the four post-event CAR windows. 
Cumulative abnormal return is the sum of the differences between the expected return on 
a stock and the actual return often used to evaluate the impact of news or specific incidents on a 
stock price. The initial action to dealing with chemical accidents takes anywhere from a little 




of plant processes may need a lot of time. I attempd to find data on the initial action and 
restoration, but there is no valid information about this in the government’s case book and the 
media. 
 
Test of Significance for Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
There are two different types of measuring statistical significant: (1) parametric tests and 
(2) nonparametric tests. Parametric tests assume that individual firm’s abnormal returns are 
normally distributed, whereas nonparametric tests do not rely on any such assumptions 
(Eventstudytools.com). Each test has a various type of t sts by test level. Depending on the null 
hypothesis tested, there are AR t-test to H0: AR=0, AAR t-test to H0: AAR=0, CAR t-test to H0: 
CAR=0, and CAAR t-test to H0: CAAR=0 in parametric tests.7 In nonparametric tests, we know 
that GRANK-test to H0: AAR=0, GRANK-test and SIGN-test to H0: CAR=0, and GRANK-test 
and GSIGN-test to H0: CAAR=0.
8 
Luoma (2011) argued that there are numerous tests for evaluating the statistical 
significance of abnormal returns. The most widely used parametric test statistics are ordinary t-
statistic and test statistics derived by Patell (1976). A one-day event period that includes the 
announcement day is the best choice, if the announcement date is known exactly. However, it is 
not always possible to pinpoint the time when the new information reaches investors. Many 
parametric tests, like the tests derived by Patell (1976) and Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen 
(1991), and the ordinary t-statistic can be applied to testing CARs over multiple day windows.  
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 Patell-test, BMP-test, and J-test can be used to tes  H0: AAR=0 and H0: CAAR=0. (AAR: Average Abnormal 
Return, CAAR: Cumulative Average Abnormal Return) 
8





Brown and Warner (1985) and Armitage (1995) showed that a standard t-test is 
appropriate for a significance test for ARs and CARs. The tests seek to test whether ARs and 
CARs are significantly different from zero and will be performed with null hypotheses as: 
                        !:   0,  :  # 0       (6) 
                        !:   0,  :  # 0      (7) 
MacKinlay (1997) pointed out that the test of these hypotheses can be conducted under 
an assumption that the distributions of AR and CAR are normally distributed as 
                        ~% &0, '       (8) 
                        , ~% &0, , '      (9) 
Brown and Warner (1985) showed that the test statistic for AR is the ratio of an abnormal 
return of event day t to its estimated standard deviation of the normal return estimation period 
while the CAR test statistic is the ratio of a cumulative abnormal return to its estimated standard 
deviation. 
                        :   ()()*(  /      (10) 
,-..   0∑   12222223!3!! %  15  




,-..   0∑   1222222227! %  15  
The test statistics of AR and CAR can be calculated from equations (10) and (11). The 
standard deviation of AR is derived from the estimaon window and the standard deviation of 
CAR is derived from the two different equations. First, the standard deviation of CAR can be 
calculated from the CARs of each event day such as in equation (11) and it is also derived from 
the square root of the length of the event window multiplied by the standard deviation of AR9. 
The t-statistic is the coefficient divided by the standard error of the coefficient. The standard 
error is an estimate of the standard deviation of the coefficient. The t-statistic is an indicator of 
the precision of the regression coefficient of the model.   
The standard deviation of CAR can be calculated from the ordinary standard deviation 
equation or the length of the event window multiplied by the standard deviation of AR. We can 
get the t-statistics of ARs and CARs with AR or CAR of each event day divided by the standard 
deviation of AR or CAR. 
 
Data 
The entire information of chemical incidents of target companies was obtained from the 
accident casebook of toxic chemicals in the Ministry of Environment (ME) and National Institute 
of Environmental Research (NIER).  
                                                           




The Korean stock market is operated by the Korea Exchange (KRX), which is the sole 
securities exchange operator in Korea. As of July 2011, the Korea Exchange had 1,785 
publically traded companies with a combined market capitalization of $1.24 trillion (KRX, 2013). 
There are several indices in the Korea Exchange: KOSPI, KOSPI 200, KRX 100, and other 
indices in the Derivatives Market Division. The Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) is 
the index in which all common stocks are traded on the stock market division. It is the 
representative stock market index of Korea similar to the Dow Jones Industrial Average or S&P 
500 in the US. Daily stock prices and the peer-group market index are collected from the Korea 
Information System Value (KISVALUE) and KOSPI. 
Capelle-Blancard and Laguna (2010) showed the problems related to providing robust 
empirical evidence on the stock market reaction to chemical disasters. This study selected 18 
different petrochemical food chemical and steel companies with 26 events. The casebook of 
toxic chemicals from ME and NIER included the 42 chemical accidents that occurred between 
2001 and 2006 in industrial complexes. However, the casebook named the company’s initials 
and it was hard to find concrete information about the accident. The only 17 accidents that had 
clear data were those that had a firm’s name listed on the Korea stock market and were gathered 
after comparing the event summary with the printed media articles. The other nine accidents 
were from searching the web with the keyword of “plant explosion” and “chemical plant fire”. 
This was the same method that Capelle-Blancard and L guna (2010) used. 
All 18 companies are in petrochemical, petroleum, and food chemical compound sectors 
of industries. There are Hanwha Chemical (HW), Lotte Chemical (LT), LG Petrochemical (LG), 
Kumho Petrochemical (KH), Cheil Industries (CH), and Daelim Industries (DL) in the Yeosu 




(KP), Hyundai EP (HD), Samyang Genex (SY), and Samsung Find Chemicals (SFC) in the 
Ulsan industrial complex. KG Chemical (KG), Kumyang (KY), DSR Corp. (DSR), and Samsung 
Electronics (SE) are located in different industrial locations. 
This research uses the chemical industry field stock index in the Korea Composite Stock 
Price Index (KOSPI) as the market portfolio () because it compiled all the petrochemical and 
chemical compound companies. The estimation period differs by researcher; Peterson’s (1989) 
estimation period ranges from 100 to 300 days while Armitage (1995) recommends 250 trading 
days or one calendar year. However, in advanced resea ch, Capelle-Blancard and Laguna (2010) 
used 190 trading days. In this study, I use an estimation window of -200 to -11 days and an event 
window of -10 to +10 days. 
Of 26 different accidents, five cases have insufficient estimation and test period and three 
accidents did not have enough data to estimate, since the Korea Exchange (KRX) did not provide 
the chemical industry field stock index before the year of 2001. The three incidents of Hanwha 
Chemical in September 24, 2001, Lotte Chemical in October 5, 2001, and Yeochun NCC10  in 
October 15, 2001 have the estimation periods of 169, 75, and 181 trading days respectively. 
The other two accidents’ test periods overlap the previous event of the same company. I use the 
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 Yeochun NCC is the consolidate company of naphtha cracking centers of Hanwha Chemical and Daelim Industry. 




RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
This section shows and discusses the results of this s udy. First, the normal return 
regression results are presented with a summary of statistics of the daily returns. Second, 
abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns of each company are discussed by the 
accidents of theirs. 
 
Summary Statistics of the Daily Returns of the Estimation Periods 
As I mentioned in previous section, I applied the normal return estimation period of 190 
trading days to obtain normal regression results. The summary statistics of the daily return of the 
estimation windows are shown in Table 2, Table 3, and Table 4. We can see the results of normal 
regression of each company’s in the tables.   Some of companies experienced both the upper and 
lower price limit. According to the Korea Exchange making concerted efforts to establish an 
orderly capital market and achieves, the price limits for both upper and lower have changed from 
4.6 (before 1995), 6 (1995), 8 (1996), 12(1998) to 15% (1998).11  
Hanwha Chemical (HW) showed only upper price limit, second out of three accidents of 
LG Petrochemical (LG) experienced lower price limit, first out of two events of Daelim Industry 
(DL) experienced upper price limit, and the other three firms Lotte Chemical (LT), Kumho 
Petrochemical (KH), and Cheil Industry (CH) did not showed both upper and lower price limits 
in the Yeosu Industrial Complex.  
                                                           
11 Daily price limit is upper and lower bound to whic the price of each issues can move on a certain day. Thus any 




SK experienced both upper and lower price limits, Hyosung (HS) showed lower price 
limit, and S-Oil (SO), Korea Petrochemical (KP), and Hyundai EP (HD) experienced upper price 
limits. The other three companies SK Energy (SKE), Samyang Genex (SY), and Samsung Fine 
Chemical (SFC) showed only not reaching upper or lower price limits in the Ulsan Industrial 
Complex. KG Chemical (KG), Kumyang (KY), and DSR exp rienced both upper and lower 
price limits, and Samsung Electronics (SE) did not show both limits. 
LG (Nov 12, 2005), KH, CH, DL (Mar 14, 2013) in the Y osu showed relatively smaller 
variability of 1.56, 2.21, 2.14, and 2.46 respectively. SKE in the Ulsan showed relatively smaller 
variability of 2.23. SY showed the smallest variability of 1.49, and LG (Mar 17, 2002), DL (Oct 
15, 2001) showed higher average daily return of 0.44, 0.45 %, and KP showed the highest 
average daily return of 0.58 %. The estimation window of each company is 190 market trading 
days, but four cases had only 169, 181 of HW, 175 of LT, and 181 trading days of DL 
respectively because the peer group stock index data of chemical and petrochemical field was 








Table 2. Summary Statistics on Daily Returns of Estimation Period of Each Event, 190 Days Before the Event Period in Yeosu 
Company HW LT LG KH CH DL 
Event Date 
Sep 24, 2001 Oct 5, 2001 Mar 17, 2002c Oct 20, 2003 Jan 22, 2006c Oct 15, 2001 
Oct 15, 2001b Oct 3, 2003c Aug 25, 2004   Mar 14, 2013 
  Nov 12, 2005c    
Maximum 
Returns (%) 
15.00 13.45 10.28 9.65 8.01 14.99 
 12.41 10.82   7.77 
  7.35    
Minimum 
Returns (%) 
-10.37 -12.74 -14.83 -7.61 -6.17 -10.61 
 -12.5 -14.64   -9.70 
  -3.58    
Average 
Returns (%) 
0.30 0.20 0.44 -0.03 0.36 0.45 
 0.33 -0.07   0.04 
  0.10    
Standard 
Deviation (%) 
4.46 3.69 3.36 2.21 2.14 3.99 
 3.24 3.13   2.46 
  1.56    
Sample 
Number 
169a 175a 190 190 190 181a 
181a 190 190   190 
  190    
a It didn’t have enough estimation window to test of 190 trading days. 
b The first and second event use the same result of estimation window, since the second event day is on the event window of the first event. 




Table 3. Summary Statistics on Daily Returns of Estimation Period of Each Event, 190 Days Before the Event Period in Ulsan 
Company SK HS SO SKE KP HD 
Event Date 
Oct 20, 2003 Sep 21, 2004 Apr 9, 2004 Oct 26, 2010 Feb 8, 2011 Aug 17, 2011 
 Feb 24, 2008c  Dec 20, 2010b   
Maximum 
Returns (%) 
15.00 10.12 15.00 7.20 14.87 14.98 
 14.40     
Minimum 
Returns (%) 
-14.95 -9.18 -7.38 -6.88 -6.47 -12.77 
 -14.17     
Average 
Returns (%) 
0.17 -0.05 0.42 0.14 0.58 0.31 
 0.23     
Standard 
Deviation (%) 
4.88 2.58 3.31 2.23 2.86 3.81 
 3.33     
Sample 
Number 
190 190 190 190 190 190 
 190     
b The first and second event use the same result of estimation window, since the second event day is on the event window of the first event. 





Table 4. Summary Statistics on Daily Returns of Estimation Period of Each Event, 190 Days Before the Event Period in Ulsan and the 
other industrial complexes 
Company SY KG KY DSR SE SFC 
Event Date 
Apr 22, 2004 Apr 28, 2004 Apr 21, 2005 Mar 10, 2006 Jan 27, 2013c Apr 14, 2013c 
Feb 27, 2011c      
Maximum 
Returns (%) 
5.19 14.29 14.93 14.91 5.20 5.54 
6.15      
Minimum 
Returns (%) 
-4.48 -15.00 -14.48 -14.48 -7.45 -4.39 
-3.98      
Average 
Returns (%) 
-0.09 -0.71 0.55 0.03 0.09 -0.02 
-0.06      
Standard 
Deviation (%) 
1.32 5.32 4.53 4.64 1.97 1.51 
1.36      
Sample 
Number 
190 190 190 190 190 190 
190      






Summary of Normal Return Regression Results 
This study estimated the normal returns with using the OLS market model and the results 
of normal returns of each company are shown in Table 5, Table 6, and Table 7. Every company 
was tested for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity: the tables include Durbin-Watson d-
statistics and White test 8-statistics. When the tests detected and I corrected for serial 
correlation and heteroskedasticity, corrected parameters and other values such as model F-
statistics and R2 replaced the original regressions. Only the KY case showed statistically 
insignificant based on the zero value of F-statistics and R2. 
Most of the estimated beta’s in the regression results were statistically significant at 1 and 
5% significance level, but the KY case was not significant at 1, 5, and 10% significant level. 
Every company but KY was also statistically significant at 1% and 5% significant level in F-
statistics. There were only four companies of SK, HS KG and SE which showed positive serial 
correlation then corrected, and heteroskedasticity was detected in ten companies of HW, LT (Oct 
5, 2001), LG (Aug 25, 2004 and Nov 12, 2005), DL (Oct 15, 2001 and Mar 14, 2013), SO, SY, 
KG, DSR, SE, and SFC with 1 and 5% of significance lev l. 
The beta’s in the regression results meaning is in terms of statistical and economic 
interpretation; for example, the company in the Ulsan industrial complex shows that the percent 
change of HW’s daily stock returns increase by an estimated 1.8781 % for each one percentage 
increases in the peer-group market returns in the statistical interpretation. In finance, the beta of a 
stock or portfolio is a number describing the correlated volatility of an asset in relation to the 




In economic interpretation, the beta of HW can be int rpreted the movement of the asset 
is generally in the same direction, but more than the movement of the peer-group market. In 
considering of the other cases, the economic interpretation is different from the beta’s size. If the 
beta is less than zero, the asset generally moves in the opposite direction as compared to the 
peer-group market. The example of this case is goldmarket which often moves opposite to the 
movement of the stock market. If the beta is equal to zero, the movement of asset is uncorrelated 
with the movement of the peer-group market.  
If the beta is between zero and one, the movement of asset is generally in the same 
direction, but less than the movement of the peer-group market. This kind of movement from a 
company can be shown making soap, but less susceptible to day-to-day fluctuation. If the beta is 
equal to one, the movement of the asset is generally in the same direction, and the same amount 
of movement can be seen in the peer-group market. If the beta is greater than one, the movement 
of the asset is generally the same direction, but more than the movement of the peer-group 
market (Wikipedia.org). The example of this case can be seen in the voltaic stock such as tech 
stock or stocks which are strongly influenced by da-to-day market news. In this study, there are 
11 firms (HW, LT, LG’s 1st and 2nd cases, DL, SK, SO, SKE, DSR)  on beta’s range from zero to 






Table 5. Normal Return Regression Results of Each Company in the Ulsan 
Company HWc LT LG KH CH DL 
Event Date Sep 24, 2001 Oct 5, 2001 Mar 17, 2002 Oct 20, 2003 Jan 22, 2006 Oct 15, 2001 
Oct 15, 2001 Oct 3, 2003 Aug 25, 2004   Mar 14, 2013 
  Nov 12, 2005    
Beta 1.8781** 1.3629** 1.29** 0.5612** 0.8532** 1.2834** 
 1.0714** 1.0401**   1.6745** 
  0.6457**    
(t-statistics) (11.73) (11.13) (12.59) (6.75) (6.34) (9.02) 
 (9.58) (12.15)   (13.78) 
  (8.03)    
Constant -0.0001 0.0009 0.0015 -0.0005 0.003 0.0032 
 0.0026 -0.002   0.0004 
  0.0003    
Model F-
statistics 
137.70** 123.94** 158.47** 45.59** 40.15** 81.43** 
 91.73** 147.54**   189.95** 
  64.51**    
R2 0.4519 0.4175 0.4574 0.1952 0.1760 0.3127 
 0.3279 0.4397   0.5026 
  0.2555    
D-Watson  
d-statistics a 
1.9852 1.8114 2.1049 2.2724 2.1629 1.7685 
 1.8944 1.9450   1.9943 
  1.8426    
White Test 8-
statistics b 
7.34* 6.02* 1.79 1.76 0.64 5.16* 
 0.25 4.03*   4.56* 




Statistically significant at 5% significance level 
Statistically significant at 1% significance level 
a Significant points of dL and dU at 5% significance level is 1.758, 1.779 when k=1. (k is the number of regressors excluding the intercept.) 
b White Test  8-statistics with * and ** indicate that the original regression results were detected to contain heterosk dasticity at 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 




Table 6. Normal Return Regression Results of Each Company in the Yeosu 
Company SK HS SO SKEc KP HD 
Event Date 
Oct 20, 2003 Sep 21, 2004 Apr 9, 2004 Oct 26, 2010 Feb 8, 2011 Aug 17, 2011 
 Feb 24, 2008  Dec 20, 2010   
Beta 
1.5051** 0.6881** 1.1988** 1.299** 0.8745** 0.8778** 
 0.973**     
(t-statistics) 
(8.71) (8.24) (9.00) (12.00) (5.36) (5.40) 
 (11.3)     
Constant 
0.001 -0.0014 0.0018 -0.0007 0.0035 0.0013 
 0.0014     
Model F-
statistics 
75.79** 67.84** 80.93** 144.00** 28.72** 29.14** 
 127.7**     
R2 
0.2873 0.2652 0.3009 0.4337 0.1325 0.1342 









    
White Test 8-
statistics b 
1.27 0.36 17.71** 0.29 1.18 0.94 
 10.12**     
* Statistically significant at 5% significance level 
** Statistically significant at 1% significance levl 
a Significant points of dL and dU at 5% significance level is 1.758, 1.779 when k=1. (k is the number of regressors excluding the intercept.) 
b White Test  8-statistics with * and ** indicate that the original regression results were detected to contain heterosk dasticity at 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 





Table 7. Normal Return Regression Results of Each Company in the Yeosu and the other complexes 
Company SY KG KY DSR SE SFC 
Event Date 
Apr 22, 2004 Apr 28, 2004 Apr 21, 2005 Mar 10, 2006 Jan 27, 2013 Apr 14, 2013 
Feb 27, 2011      
Beta 
0.2855** 0.5324* 0.0045 1.0866** 0.7609** 0.5620** 
0.2328**      
(t-statistics) 
(4.77) (2.13) (0.02) (3.42) (6.78) (5.08) 
(2.90)      
Constant 
-0.0016 -0.0085 0.0055 -0.0007 0.0011 -0.0001 
-0.0011      
Model F-
statistics 
22.77** 4.53* 0.00 11.69** 46.01** 25.81** 
8.41**      
R2 
0.1080 0.0236 2.07E-06 0.0585 0.1966 0.1207 










1.8671      
White Test 8-
statistics b 
1.33 2.32 0.45 2.42 2.46 0.84 
5.07      
* Statistically significant at 5% significance level 
** Statistically significant at 1% significance levl 
a Significant points of dL and dU at 5% significance level is 1.758, 1.779 when k=1. (k is the number of regressors excluding the intercept.) 




Summary of Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
This section shows the calculated abnormal returns (ARs) and cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs). Table 8 through Table 11 details the results. Tables show the values of ARs and 
CARs by company and event, attaching t-statistics of each AR and CAR. 
We know the concept of AR and CAR and how to calculte the values from the method 
section. For example, this is how to derive AR of day -10 (10 days before the event day) and 
CAR of 5 days (The adding up value during the 5 days’ ARs from the event day) of Daelim 
Industry (DL). a) Collect the adjusted stock price data of DL from the Korea Information System 
Value (KISVALUE) and the peer-group stock index data (Chemical Industry) from the Korea 
Exchange (KRX). b) Calculate the returns of DL’s daily djusted stock price and peer-group’s 
daily index of each day.  
c) Run the OLS regression with the DL’s daily stock price returns as an explanatory 
variable and the peer-group stock index returns as a predictor variable. d) Get the results of alpha 
of 0.0004 and beta of 1.6745 and the day -10’s peer-group stock return value of -0.00246. e) Put 
the three value of alpha, beta, and the day -10’s stock return into the equation (2) 
9Expected Return  0.0004  1.6745 I 0.00246K, then get the day -10’s expected return 
value of -0.004. f) Put the day -10’s peer-group exected stock return value into the equation (4) 
with the DL’s daily stock price return of day -10 9AR  0.01255  0.004  0.0086K, 
then we get the abnormal return of 0.86% of day -10.
  To get the CAR of 5 days, a) do the same processes from day -10 to day 5. b) The value 
of CAR during 5 days after the event is the value of sum of ARs from day -10 to day 5. c) The 




(day -5), -2.23 (day -4), -0.31 (day -3), -0.37 (day -2), -0.66 (day -1), 0.52 (day 0:The Event Day), 
0.21 (day 1), 0.92 (day 2), 1.21 (day 3), -0.25 (day 4), -1.36 (day 5), then the sum of ARs is -2.18 
which is the same to the value of CAR during 5 days of DL. 
 
The Chemical disasters in the Yeosu Industrial Complex between 2001 and 2013 
There are 11 chemical accidents from six different companies of HW, LT, LG, KH, CH, 
and DL, and ARs and CARs of each company’s event indicates that the explosions, fires, and 
chemical leaks had impacts on the firm’s stock price. 
The companies tested in the study showed significant ARs in the each event.  LT’s the 
second accident showed statistically significant negative ARs on day 0, day 4, and day 5 after the 
event and positive AR on day 7.  LG’s the first event on Mar 17, 2002 showed statistically 
significant negative AR on day 4, but it rebounded positive ARs on day 5 and day 6 which 
means the accident had an impact on the company’s stock price. The third accident of LG 
showed significant negative ARs on day 2 and day 8, but positive ARs on day 3, day 5, and day 
10. 
CH showed significant negative ARs on day 5 and positive ARs on day 2, day 7, and day 
8. I saw positive market reaction on day 2 after th event, because the information of the accident 
did not spread out to the public (Hamilton 1995) that t e market and shareholders did not place 
orders after the accident. The first accident of DL showed statistically significant positive ARs 
on day 1 and day 2. Unlike the first one of LG, the second accident showed significant negative 
AR on day 8 not after the accident. KH showed statitically significant negative AR on day 6 




Generally, the market reaction to chemical disasters is to be negative, but some of cases 
showed statistically significant positive ARs. The statistically significant positive AR means that 
the investors did not have negative movements becaus  the extent of accident was small the 
shareholders did not worry about their financial losses.  
After the event occurring, each company showed different directions of CARs. LT 
showed statistically significant negative CAR in 5 day post-event windows while the 10, 20, and 
30 day post-event windows showed insignificant negative CARs. The second event of LG 
showed statistically significant positive CARs in 5, 10, 20, and 30 day post-event windows. KH 
showed statistically significant negative CAR in 10 days since then the event occurred, but 
presented significant positive CARs in 20 and 30 day post-event windows. The rest of companies 
in the Yeosu industrial complex showed statistically insignificant negative CAR results because 
the CAR captures the total firm-specific stock movement for an event period when the market 
responses to the information of the accident. The reason the CARs are insignificant is that the 




Table 8. Abnormal Returns of Each Company in Yeosu 




Mar 14, 2013 Oct 20, 2003 Sep 21, 2004 Feb 24, 2008Apr 9, 2004 Oct 26, 2010 Feb 8, 2011 Aug 17, 2011 Apr 22, 2004 





-0.86 -2.28 -0.16 0.03 5.79** 1.03 -4.33** 0.76 -1.34 
(-0.46) (-0.62) (-0.07) (0.01) (2.25) (0.58) (-1.97) (0.26) (-0.93) 
 
-9 
1.02 0.88 1.31 -0.25 -0.13 -0.20 -2.20 -1.99 -2.82** 
(0.54) (0.24) (0.58) (-0.09) (-0.05) (-0.11) (-1.00) (-0.68) (-1.97) 
-8 
0.55 -0.99 -2.80 -2.36 0.54 -3.86** 0.22 -0.10 -0.97 
(0.29) (-0.27) (-1.23) (-0.84) (0.21) (-2.19) (0.10) (-0.03) (-0.68) 
-7 
-0.29 0.84 1.38 -4.48* -0.35 0.54 -4.80** -4.24 0.39 
(-0.15) (0.23) (0.61) (-1.59) (-0.14) (0.31) (-2.19) (-1.46) (0.27) 
-6 
0.19 -2.94 0.76 2.53 -0.81 -0.64 0.78 -6.20** -0.57 
(0.10) (-0.80) (0.33) (0.90) (-0.32) (-0.36) (0.36) (-2.13) (-0.40) 
-5 
-0.46 1.52 0.27 1.86 -4.18* 0.38 6.80*** 9.40*** 0.98 
(-0.24) (0.41) (0.12) (0.66) (-1.62) (0.21) (3.10) (3.22) (0.68) 
-4 
-2.23 -6.35* -1.55 3.99 -1.08 -2.11 -4.26** 2.60 0.46 
(-1.18) (-1.74) (-0.68) (1.42) (-0.42) (-1.20) (-1.94) (0.89) (0.32) 
-3 
-0.31 0.13 4.31* 0.00 -1.12 -0.22 -2.55 -0.96 -1.83 
(-0.17) (0.03) (1.90) (0.00) (-0.44) (-0.13) (-1.16) (-0.33) (-1.28) 
-2 
-0.37 0.85 0.90 -1.32 -0.44 1.35 -2.11 1.25 0.64 
(-0.20) (0.23) (0.40) (-0.47) (-0.17) (0.76) (-0.96) (0.43) (0.45) 
-1 
-0.66 1.99 -1.94 2.49 5.10** 2.34 -0.39 0.02 0.12 
(-0.35) (0.54) (-0.85) (0.89) (1.98) (1.33) (-0.18) (0.01) (0.09) 
0 
0.52 2.85 1.98 -2.25 1.41 -0.69 -5.16** -1.16 -0.26 
(0.28) (0.78) (0.87) (-0.80) (0.55) (-0.39) (-2.35) (0.40) (-0.18) 
+1 
0.21 3.47 2.63 -2.63 7.06*** -0.99 0.31 -8.36*** -1.81 





0.92 -0.55 4.07* 4.49* -0.30 -2.46 0.35 -5.61** 0.62 
(0.49) (-0.15) (1.79) (1.76) (-0.11) (-1.40) (0.16) (-1.93) (0.43) 
+3 
1.21 6.65* 2.21 -0.66 -2.89 -0.06 -1.05 3.89 3.37** 
(0.64) (1.82) (0.97) (-0.23) (-1.12) (-0.03) (-0.48) (1.34) (2.35) 
+4 
-0.25 -1.03 -1.08 0.90 -4.48* 0.11 -5.51*** 4.77* -0.69 
(-0.13) (-0.28) (-0.48) (0.32) (-1.74) (0.06) (-2.51) (1.64) (-0.48) 
+5 
-1.36 -1.80 0.03 -1.10 -1.11 2.73* 4.40** -3.20 1.16 
(-0.72) (-0.49) (0.01) (-0.39) (-0.43) (1.55) (2.01) (-1.10) (0.81) 
+6 
1.92 -3.07 -0.87 -1.22 -2.03 -1.44 -1.91 -3.58 2.07 
(1.02) (-0.84) (-0.38) (-0.43) (-0.79) (-0.82) (-0.87) (-1.23) (1.44) 
+7 
1.27 4.73 -0.29 3.81 3.51 -1.63 0.08 3.25 2.06 
(0.67) (1.29) (-0.13) (1.36) (1.37) (-0.92) (0.03) (1.12) (1.44) 
+8 
1.10 1.21 4.27** 5.41** 0.44 4.95*** -1.11 -2.15 1.18 
(0.58) (0.33) (2.07) (1.93) (0.17) (2.80) (-0.51) (-0.74) (0.82) 
+9 
-0.65 2.94 -3.97* 0.87 -0.95 0.05 -0.83 1.06 -3.93*** 
(-0.34) (0.80) (-1.74) (0.31) (-0.37) (0.03) (-0.38) (0.36) (-2.74) 
+10 
0.55 5.06 2.81 -0.25 -2.88 0.34 0.27 -1.85 -1.02 
(0.29) (1.38) (1.24) (-0.09) (-1.12) (0.19) (0.12) (-0.64) (-0.71) 
Day 0 is the event day. 




Statistically significant at 1% significance level (AR>2.60) 
*
* 
Statistically significant at 5% significance level (AR>1.97) 
* Statistically significant at 10% significance level (AR>1.65) 






The Chemical disasters in Ulsan Industrial Complex b tween 2001 and 2013 
There are 11 accidents with eight different firms of SK, HS, SO, SKE, KP, HD, SY, and 
SFC. SK showed statistically significant positive AR on day 3, and the first accident of HS 
showed statistically significant positive ARs on day 2 and day 8, and negative ARs on day 9. The 
second case of HS showed significant positive ARs on day 2 and day 8 after the event. SO 
presented statistically significant positive ARs on day 1 and significant negative ARs on day 4. 
SKE showed statistically significant positive ARs on day 5 and day 8 after the event. KP 
presented statistically significant negative ARs on day 0 and day 4 and significant positive AR 
on day 5 after the event.  
HD showed statistically significant negative ARs on day 1 and day 2 and significant 
positive ARs on day 4. The first case of SY showed statistically significant negative ARs on day 
9 and significant positive ARs on day 3. The second accident of SY did not presented 
statistically significant negative or positive ARs. SFC showed statistically significant positive 
AR on day 1 after the event and significant negative AR on day 2. 
The first event of HS showed statistically significant positive CAR in 20 day post-event 
windows and insignificant positive CARs in 5, 10, and 30 days since then the event occurred. KP 
presented statistically distinct results of significant negative CARs in 10, 20, and 30 day post-
event windows. SK, the second event of HS, and SO showed insignificant positive CARs, but 
SKE, HD, and SY showed negative CARs. The reason why the firms showed 






Table 9. Abnormal Returns of Each Company in Ulsan 




Sep 24, 2001 Oct 5, 2001 Oct 3, 2003 Mar 17, 2002 Aug 25, 2004 Nov 12, 2005 Oct 20, 2003 Jan 22, 2006 Oct 15, 2001 





0.38 -0.76 0.52 -2.93 0.07 -1.13 -1.92 0.24 -1.03 
(0.11) (-0.26) (0.20) (-1.10) (0.03) (-0.81) (-0.97) (0.14) (-0.33) 
 -9 
1.49 -1.96 -0.75 -0.40 1.64 0.00 -1.05 1.48 -0.97 
(0.45) (-0.68) (-0.29) (-0.15) (0.62) (0.00) (-0.53) (0.88) (-0.32) 
 -8 
2.33 2.59 -4.40* 2.77 5.62** 0.98 0.16 -2.11 0.50 
(0.70) (0.90) (-1.69) (1.03) (2.14) (0.70) (0.08) (-1.25) (0.16) 
 
-7 
5.42* 0.70 2.85 0.11 0.67 1.11 -5.58*** -1.07 -4.14 
(1.62) (0.24) (1.10) (0.04) (0.25) (0.79) (-2.81) (-0.63) (-1.35) 
-6 
-2.52 0.58 4.04* 1.45 0.88 1.80 -1.32 -1.48 -2.56 
(-0.75) (0.20) (1.55) (0.54) (0.33) (1.29) (-0.67) (-0.88) (-0.83) 
-5 
-10.96*** -0.48 -1.83 1.62 1.69 -1.40 1.77 4.48*** -1.89 
(-3.28) (-0.17) (-0.70) (0.61) (0.64) (-1.00) (0.89) (2.65) (-0.61) 
-4 
3.61 -0.47 -2.47 3.04 -0.51 1.79 -1.00 -1.43 -0.34 
(1.08) (-0.16) (-0.95) (1.14) (-0.20) (1.28) (-0.50) (-0.85) (-0.11) 
-3 
-4.41 -1.52 2.37 -3.20 0.86 2.20* 0.47 -2.29 -1.87 
(-1.32) (-0.53) (0.91) (-1.19) (0.33) (1.57) (0.24) (-1.35) (-0.61) 
-2 
4.43 -0.75 -2.51 -6.01** -0.64 -0.11 -2.46 -0.96 -1.55 
(1.33) (-0.26) (-0.97) (-2.24) (-0.24) (-0.08) (-1.24) (-0.57) (-0.50) 
-1 
2.75 0.91 1.97 -1.60 -0.96 2.19* 1.53 -4.08*** 3.96 
(0.82) (0.32) (0.76) (-0.60) (-0.37) (1.57) (0.77) (-2.41) (1.28) 
0 
0.28 0.70 -4.22* 1.98 1.12 -0.66 -2.03 2.49 -0.46 
(0.08) (0.24) (-1.62) (0.74) (0.43) (-0.47) (-1.03) (1.47) (-0.15) 
+1 
-4.26 -2.11 -1.06 -0.23 1.89 0.66 -0.64 2.36 4.83* 





-2.14 -1.41 -1.15 -0.32 1.77 -3.43*** 0.21 6.14*** 6.14** 
(-0.64) (-0.49) (-0.44) (-0.12) (0.67) (-2.45) (0.11) (3.63) (1.99) 
+3 
-2.29 -1.27 -2.32 -1.06 1.44 4.29*** -0.45 1.98 0.63 
(-0.68) (-0.44) (-0.89) (-0.40) (0.55) (3.07) (-0.23) (1.17) (0.21) 
+4 
-2.99 2.46 -5.14** -14.51*** -0.74 -0.51 0.35 -0.12 -2.67 
(-0.89) (0.85) (-1.98) (-5.41) (-0.28) (-0.36) (0.18) (-0.07) (-0.87) 
+5 
2.98 1.29 -4.98** 14.73*** -2.31 2.84** 3.04* -3.10* -0.40 
(0.89) (0.45) (-1.91) (5.50) (-0.88) (2.03) (1.53) (-1.83) (-0.13) 
+6 
0.72 -1.32 1.39 4.37* -0.84 -0.30 -2.96* -0.40 -0.78 
(0.22) (-0.46) (0.53) (1.63) (-0.32) (-0.21) (-1.49) (-0.24) (-0.25) 
+7 
3.26 -1.38 4.17* 0.44 1.32 0.13 0.20 2.87* -1.71 
(0.97) (-0.48) (1.60) (0.16) (0.50) (0.09) (0.10) (1.69) (-0.55) 
+8 
-0.78 1.91 -1.48 0.61 -3.56* -1.95* -0.55 5.66*** 2.83 
(-0.23) (0.66) (-0.57) (0.23) (-1.36) (-1.40) (-0.28) (3.35) (0.92) 
+9 
0.84 -0.12 3.07 -0.16 -1.38 0.21 -0.88 -1.34 -1.60 
(0.25) (-0.04) (1.18) (-0.06) (-0.53) (0.15) (-0.44) (-0.79) (-0.52) 
+10 
2.21 0.90 0.16 2.89 0.63 2.53** -1.44 0.12 -3.39 
(0.66) (0.31) (0.06) (1.08) (0.24) (1.81) (-0.73) (0.07) (-1.10) 
Day 0 is the event day. 




Statistically significant at 1% significance level (AR>2.60) 
*
* 
Statistically significant at 5% significance level (AR>1.97) 
* Statistically significant at 10% significance level (AR>1.65) 






The Chemical disasters in The Other Industrial Complex between 2001 and 2013 
There are four accidents with four different companies of KG, KY, DSR, and SE. KY 
located in Gyeonggi in Korea showed statistically significant negative ARs on day 5 and day 6, 
and significant positive AR on day 7. DSR presented statistically significant negative AR on day 
3 after the event. SE showed statistically significant negative AR on day 0 of the event date.  
KG showed statistically insignificant positive CARs in 5, 10, and 20 day, and significant 
positive CAR in 30 day post-event windows. KY presented statistically significant CARs in 5, 20, 
and 30 days since then the accident occurred. The other companies of DSR and SE showed 
statistically insignificant negative CARs in post-event windows. 
There is a factor that affects the market reaction of statistically insignificant CARs of the 
firms: if the media coverage is low, the investors cannot get the data of the firms. Hamilton 
(1995) explained that the accessibility to the information is the cause of statistical significance. 
The factors which decide the movement of stock price are the size of firm, the type of accident 
and casualty, and the number of accident occurrence of same company. When the results of ARs 
and CARs of each firm, we see the major market influencing factor is the size of company and 







Table 10. Abnormal Returns of Each Company in Yeosu and the or complexes 




Feb 27, 2011 Apr 28, 2004 Apr 21, 2005 Mar 10, 2006 Jan 27, 2013 Apr 14, 2013 





0.18 -0.23 -2.70 2.99 1.87 -0.78 
(0.14) (-0.06) (-0.80) (0.89) (1.16) (-0.62) 
 
-9 
3.74*** 0.71 5.28* 5.10* -2.27 -1.49 
(2.89) (0.18) (1.57) (1.52) (-1.41) (-1.18) 
-8 
-1.17 1.02 -4.69 -0.12 -0.81 1.82 
(-0.90) (0.26) (-1.39) (-0.03) (-0.50) (1.45) 
-7 
0.05 1.47 -0.55 -0.76 -1.77 -0.56 
(0.04) (0.37) (-0.16) (-0.23) (-1.10) (-0.45) 
-6 
-0.67 0.07 2.33 -2.62 0.25 -0.63 
(-0.52) (0.02) (0.69) (-0.78) (0.15) (-0.50) 
-5 
-1.42 0.48 -4.73 4.79 -1.60 -1.40 
(-1.10) (0.12) (-1.40) (1.42) (-0.99) (-1.12) 
-4 
-0.03 1.37 -3.47 1.74 2.25 -2.28* 
(-0.02) (0.35) (-1.03) (0.52) (1.40) (-1.81) 
-3 
-0.06 4.58 -10.31*** 0.10 0.42 0.95 
(-0.04) (1.16) (-3.06) (0.03) (0.26) (0.75) 
-2 
1.20 -0.61 2.77 7.47** -1.20 0.23 
(0.93) (-0.15) (0.82) (2.22) (-0.74) (0.18) 
-1 
0.18 -1.26 -1.37 -0.18 -2.11 -0.65 
(0.14) (-0.32) (-0.41) (-0.05) (-1.31) (-0.52) 
0 
-0.11 2.20 2.70 4.07 -3.06* -0.22 
(-0.09) (0.56) (0.80) (1.21) (-1.90) (-0.17) 
+1 
-0.58 0.33 2.60 -1.22 1.95 3.41*** 





0.84 1.41 -2.08 -4.79 2.30 -2.01* 
(0.65) (0.36) (-0.62) (-1.43) (1.43) (-1.60) 
+3 
-0.69 3.53 -4.43 -10.71*** 0.50 -1.75 
(-0.53) (0.90) (-1.32) (-3.19) (0.31) (-1.39) 
+4 
-1.12 1.82 -2.16 -2.27 0.26 -1.77 
(-0.86) (0.46) (-0.64) (-0.68) (0.16) (-1.41) 
+5 
0.05 1.4 -7.1** -3.39 0.04 1.31 
(0.04) (0.35) (-2.11) (-1.01) (0.02) (1.04) 
+6 
-0.37 0.29 -8.44*** -0.30 0.51 -0.24 
(-0.29) (0.07) (-2.51) (-0.09) (0.32) (-0.19) 
+7 
-1.17 2.07 13.73*** 1.07 0.06 1.88 
(-0.91) (0.52) (4.08) (0.32) (0.04) (1.50) 
+8 
0.40 -2.79 0.28 -2.00 -0.71 -1.44 
(0.31) (-0.71) (0.08) (-0.59) (-0.44) (-1.15) 
+9 
-0.88 1.38 -0.57 3.59 2.49 0.43 
(-0.68) (0.35) (-0.17) (1.07) (1.55) (0.34) 
+10 
-0.79 2.89 -2.22 -4.19 0.29 0.91 
(-0.61) (0.73) (-0.66) (-1.25) (0.18) (0.72) 
Day 0 is the event day. 




Statistically significant at 1% significance level (AR>2.60) 
*
* 
Statistically significant at 5% significance level (AR>1.97) 







Table 11. Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Each Company 
Company Day HWb LT LT LG LG LG KH CH DL 
Event Date  
Sep 24, 2001 Oct 5, 2001 Oct 3, 2003 Mar 17, 2002 Aug 25, 2004 Nov 12, 2005 Oct 20, 2003 Jan 22, 2006 Oct 15, 2001 








-5.88 -1.50 -19.07* -4.57 12.47 10.62* -8.93 2.52 -1.84 





0.37 -1.51 -11.77 3.57 8.63 11.24* -14.56* 9.43 -6.48 




-10.35 -4.03 -5.40 3.53 10.26 12.28* 31.50*** 5.67 -7.15 




1.32 8.35 -3.61 2.69 8.43 18.86*** 66.46*** 6.41 -2.30 
 (0.09) (0.63) (-0.30) (0.22) (0.70) (2.94) (7.31) (0.83) (-0.16) 
Company  DL SK HS HS SO SKEb KP HD SY 
Event Date  
Mar 14, 2013 
Oct 20, 
2013 
Sep 21, 2004 Feb 24, 2008 Apr 9, 2004 Oct 26, 2010 Feb 8, 2011 Aug 17, 2011 Apr 22, 2004 








-2.18 3.23 12.31 1.70 3.00 -2.76 -19.51 -9.15 -2.56 





2.00 14.11 14.71 10.33 1.09 -0.50 -23.03** -12.42 -2.19 




-7.28 14.83 33.60*** 12.53 1.53 -1.70 -29.17*** -8.03 -4.34 




-8.81 18.59 14.86 7.15 4.42 -0.11 -24.95** -4.51 -5.12 
 (-1.02) (1.11) (1.43) (0.55) (0.37) (-0.01) (-2.48) (-0.34) (-0.78) 
Values in parentheses are t-statistics. 
Significant at 1% significance level (CAR 5-day>4.60, CAR 10-day>3.25, CAR 20-day>2.86, CAR 30-day>2.75) 
Significant at 5% significance level (CAR 5-day>2.78, CAR 10-day>2.26, CAR 20-day>2.09, CAR 30-day>2.04) 
Significant at 10% significance level (CAR 5-day>2.13, CAR 10-day>1.83, CAR 20-day>1.72, CAR 30-day>1.69) 
a Not enough data 




Table 11. Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Each Company, continued 
Company Day SY KG KY DSR SE SFC    
Event Date  
Feb 27, 2011 Apr 28, 2004 Apr 21, 2005 Mar 10, 2006 Jan 27, 2013 Apr 14, 2013    








0.38 18.31 -27.91* 0.18 -2.97 -5.83    





-2.43 22.14 -25.12 -1.65 -0.32 -4.29    




6.81 20.44 -39.99** -3.70 0.52 -8.03    




5.33 34.11* -47.33*** -4.25 0.81 a    
 (0.90) (1.89) (-3.07) (-0.28) (0.11)     
Values in parentheses are t-statistics. 
Significant at 1% significance level (CAR 5-day>4.60, CAR 10-day>3.25, CAR 20-day>2.86, CAR 30-day>2.75) 
Significant at 5% significance level (CAR 5-day>2.78, CAR 10-day>2.26, CAR 20-day>2.09, CAR 30-day>2.04) 
Significant at 10% significance level (CAR 5-day>2.13, CAR 10-day>1.83, CAR 20-day>1.72, CAR 30-day>1.69) 









The Graphs of Each Industrial Complex’s CARs +10 after the Event Day 
We see two graphs (Figure 1. ~ Figure 2.) of CARs of each industrial complex which 
graphically explain the market reaction to the chemical disasters. Most of firm which I tried to 
test the hypotheses showed negative CARs after the event as I expected. We confirm the results 
from each figure shows statistically significant or insignificant negative CARs. According to the 
types, extent, and a number of casualties of accidents, the height of bar are different from case by 
case. 
The four cases (LT1st, LT2nd, KH, DL1st) in the Yeosu industrial complex showed 
statistically significant negative CARs on day +10 after the event. The six accidents (SKE, KP, 
HD, SY1st, SY2nd, SFC) in the Ulsan industrial complex presented the statistically significant 
negative CARs on day +10 after the accident. From the graphs, the Ulsan industrial complex 
showed more negative market reaction than the Yeosu. 
We can see Figure 3. ~ Figure 26 showing the ARs and CARs of each company. Some of 
them show negative abnormal returns after the event day and some of them don’t. There can be a 





































































Figure 3. Hanwha Chemical (The Event Date: 09/24/01, 10/15/01) 
 
 

























Figure 5. Lotte Petrochemical (The Event Date: 10/03/03) 
 
 



























Figure 7. LG Petrochemical CO., Ltd. (The Event Date: 08/25/04) 
 
 


























Figure 9. Kumho Petrochemical (The Event Date: 10/20/03) 
 
 

























Figure 11. Daelim Industry (The Event Date: 10/15/01) 
 
 

























Figure 13. SK CO., Ltd. (The Event Date: 10/20/03) 
 
 


























Figure 15. Hyosung (The Event Date: 02/24/08) 
 
 

























Figure 17. SK Energy (The Event Date: 10/26/10, 12/20/10) 
 
 



























Figure 19. Hyundai EP (The Event Date: 08/17/11) 
 
 

























Figure 21. Samyang Genex (The Event Date: 02/27/11) 
 
 



























Figure 23. Kumyang (The Event Date: 04/21/05) 
 
 
































Figure 25. Samsung Electronics (The Event Date: 01/27/13) 
 
 
























CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
The chemistry corporations in Korea are not large enough to have conditions applicable 
to global firms: capital, resources, innovation, and the market. The companies do not have 
business portfolios which make them global with regard to capital, competitive with the 
oligopoly of oil-producing countries and international oil companies’ control of natural resources, 
lack the petrochemical technology of Japan and the Am rican companies, and the market share 
for national chemical companies’ expansion. The life cycle of the chemical industry is relatively 
longer than the other industries due to high investm nt costs and lengthy product life cycles 
(PLC). The productive firms in chemical industries are likely to take action on the objectives and 
business portfolios great insight. 
This analysis which was based on using abnormal returns (ARs) and cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) concluded that chemical disasters like explosions, plant fires, and 
chemical leaks caused the both negative and positive s ock market reaction. This study included 
18 chemical and petrochemical companies with 26 different accidents between 2001 and 2013. 
Abnormal returns are triggered by ‘event’ and the abnormal returns are derived from the 
deals in the stock market by individuals and companies. If the event date is to be the first day of 
abnormal negative return, there can be unobserved variable affected by normal return. However, 
we can use the event date as the first day of abnormal negative return and check how the results 




The major topic in this study is to confirm the relationships between the accident and the 
company’s abnormal returns. I did not check the mutual relationships among the companies but 
it is worth to see that with the interaction terms in OLS. 
All of the results did not match my expectations. Four cases (DL1st, SK, HS2nd, SKE) in 
ARs and three cases (LG3rd, HS1st, KG) in CARs revealed different results; and only presented 
statistically significant positive ARs and CARs since the event windows. The companies that 
showed significant positive ARs and CARs are HS (Feb 24, 2004) on day 2 and day 8, SKE (Oct 
26, 2010 and Dec 20, 2010) on day 5 and day 8, SK (Oct 20, 2003) on day 3, and DL (Oct 15, 
2001) on day 1 and day 2 in ARs results. The LG (Nov 12, 2005) in four post-event windows (5, 
10, 20, and 30 days), KG (Apr 28, 2004) in CAR 30 days, and HS (Sep 21, 2004) in CAR 20 
days showed significant positive CARs after the event day. 
I initially thought that the effects on stock market r actions were different due to the type, 
extent, and number of casualties in the accident. When I performed the event study with the topic, 
I got the results from 15 cases of the relationship between the ARs or CARs and the extent, type, 
and the number of casualties. However, all of the cases did not show the same results. The 16 
cases revealed that the degree of severity of the chemical accidents was not really related to the 
market reaction. The reason why the unmatched results arose was because of the exposure of the 
event information. Hamilton (1995) mentioned that the market is influenced by the leak of 
information. 
I have concluded that the relationship between the ARs/CARs and the extent, type of 
accidents, and the number of casualties are not seri u ly related to each other. However, there is 




This makes it possible that the market and investors will not to think of selling the shares. The 
other possible reason why the result occurred relates to the media exposure. The bigger the size 
of the accident, the less the target company reveals. Such information control is common in 
Korea and companies located in industrial complexes often conceal news about their accidents. 
What factors influencing the share price of companies are: 1) Is the company making 
money? 2) People running the company 3) Taking overther companies and 4) Technological 
innovation. As we know, the market reacts what the company shows to the public. Besides these 
four factors, there might be a lot of factors can be existed. Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald 
(1990) showed the asymmetry should be of greatest concern to potential buyers of common stock. 
That means there should be a factor(s) affect(s) the market and its behavior.     
According to the Center for Occupational Environmental Health (COEH) in Korea, there 
was a briefing session in June 2013 about the current state of concealment of fires, explosions 
and chemical spills in industrial complexes at the congress. The statistical data investigation 
about the accident has a couple of problems. First, there is no report of the accident to local 
authority if the petrochemical plant doesn’t have death casualties. That means they handle the 
problem internally. Second, there are statistical differences in the accident investigations 
between the central and the local government. Lastly, the classification of industrial accidents is 
not established precisely. In other words, the company creating employments and local economic 
growths can have more power to the local and control over local media. 
For example, One of firm I tested in the study, Daelim industry (Mar 14, 2013), was 
charged in the manipulating and concealment of information about the accident. The Ministry of 




prosecution opened the investigation report to the public that Daelim industry’s accident report 
was falsified to shift the liability for the incident. Plant manager and offices of Daelim industry 
were charged in professional negligence resulting in death and injured.     
This study has a few limitations. First, the company that has experienced the accident is 
likely to control the information. It results in a l ck of information regarding incidents. When I 
tried to collect the data of the events related to chemical disasters, I found hundreds of cases in 
my target industrial complexes from the casebook of toxic chemicals of the Ministry of 
Environment (ME) and National Institute of Environmental Research (NIER). However, there 
are only random initials on the event in the governme t’s accidents casebook. I then made an 
effort to look for information about the accidents within the media sources such as newspapers 
and online websites. Nothing else showed up.   
Second, the number of sample companies was quite low.  This study included only 18 
companies with 26 different cases. I collected 42 accidents related to chemical disasters from the 
casebook from ME and NIER. There were only firms’ initials with the exact information about 
the accidents. The 25 cases were excluded from the lis  of the casebook, and nine cases from the 
various sources were then added to the sample list. The sources consisted of the online local 
newspapers of Yeosu and Ulsan, press releases from the Ministry of Employment and Labor 
(MOEL), statistics of National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), and so on. 
The papers and other studies using the same event study methodology over 
environmental accidents and chemical disasters showed abnormal and cumulative abnormal 
returns and other meaningful results. For example, Capelle-Blancard and Laguna (2010) 




They also tried to collect a large number of events from around the world. Herbst, Marshall, and 
Wingender (1996) showed the same movement of the stock market as the one that I analyzed 
with regard to the accident. 
The 15 accidents related to chemical disasters showed statistically significant negative 
ARs and four cases showed significant negative CARs after the event (Table 12.~13.). The three 
firms (KP, LT2nd, SE) showed statistically significant negative ARs on the event day, and the 
LT2nd accident showed three significant negative ARs after the event day. The companies that 
showed significant negative ARs have more reliable saf ty standards in their chemical plants 
because they have experienced financial losses throug  the accidents.  
Table 12. Companies showing significant negative/positive AR after the event day 
 
Companies showing Significant 
Negative AR after the Event Day 
Companies showing Significant 




KP, LT(10/03/03), SE  
Day +1 HD DL (10/15/01), SFC, SO 
Day +2 HD, LG (11/12/05), SFC 
CH, DL(10/15/01),  
HS (09/21/04), HS (02/24/08)   
Day +3 DSR LG (11/12/15), SK, SY (04/22/04)  
Day +4 
LG (03/17/02), LT (10/03/03),  
SO, KP 
 
Day +5 CH, KY , LT (10/03/03) 
KH, KP, LG (03/17/02),  
LG (11/12/05), SKE 




Day +7  CH, KY, LT (10/03/03)  
Day +8 LG (08/25/04), LG (11/12/05) 
CH, HS (09/21/04),  
HS (02/24/08), SKE 
Day +9 HS (09/21/04), SY (04/22/04)  
Day +10  LG (11/12/05) 
Total 15 / 26 cases 16 / 26 cases 
The number in parenthesis is the different event dates of the same company. 
(Month/Date/Year)  
 
Table 13. Companies showing significant negative/positive CAR after the event day  
 
Companies showing Significant 
Negative CAR after the Event Day 
Companies showing Significant 
Positive CAR after the Event Day 
Day +5 LT (10/03/03), KY LG (11/12/05) 
Day +10 KH, KP LG (11/12/05) 
Day +20 KP, KY HS (09/21/04), LG (11/12/05), KH 
Day +30 KP, KY LG (11/12/05), KH, KG 
Total 4 cases / 26 cases 4 cases / 26 cases  
The number in parenthesis is the different event dates of the same company. 
(Month/Date/Year)  
 
The 16 accidents showed a statistically significant positive AR and the four cases (LG3rd, 
HS1st, KH, KG) showed significant positive CARs after the accidents, because information about 




have been careful to avoid accidents. Moreover, they ar  not likely to improve their safety 
requirements. In concluding this study, the companies that experienced the chemical disasters 
tend to improve or neglect their safety requirements due to the market’s reaction and the market 
reaction is heavily influenced by the leaks of the accident information (Hamilton, 1995). 
Objectives of the study are initially to see the relationship between the chemical accidents 
and the companies’ stock response to the market reaction but there are not a few factors affecting 
the market but the accident itself. Besides, there are a couple of different methodologies 
available to use to seeing the relationships such as 2SLS and Tobit Model. These can be also 
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